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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
THE USEFULNESS OF CLIMATE CHANGE RISK DISCLOSURE:  
EVIDENCE FROM SEC FR-82 
 
On February 8, 2010, the SEC issued an interpretive guidance, SEC FR-82, (guidance 
hereafter) and required public firms to disclose climate change risk in their 10-Ks. However, 
this guidance has been controversial. Using firm-year observations from the Russell 3000 
Index, this paper shows the following findings regarding the usefulness of climate change 
risk disclosure. First, a review of the legislative process leading to the 2010 guidance 
suggests that institutional investors and Democratic politicians play a key role in lobbying 
the SEC to require the climate change disclosure. Second,  firms with climate change risk 
disclosures have lower future return on assets, driven mainly by lower profit margin. Third, 
these firms also have lower earnings persistence and smaller forward earnings response 
coefficient (FERC). Fourth, an event study reveals that these firms experience significantly 
lower cumulative abnormal return during the 5-days around the 10-K filing date, indicating 
that investors may incorporate this information into their investment decisions. Fifth, 
textual analysis indicates that less readable climate change risk disclosure exacerbates the 
aforementioned effects. Sixth, these firms have lower future firm value, indicating that the 
climate change risk disclosure signals future firm value. Lastly, tests show that climate 
change disclosure in the 10-K is more informative than that voluntarily disclosed in the 
Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) survey, indicating that SEC-mandated disclosure 
provides information incremental to voluntary disclosure. Overall, this paper documents 
the usefulness of climate change risk disclosure required under SEC FR-82. 
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1. Introduction 
Climate change risk is driven by changes in regulations (e.g., carbon emission 
reduction, cap-and-trade, and carbon taxes), changes in physical climate parameters (e.g., 
severe weather) and changes in other climate-related developments (e.g., changing 
business trend and consumer behavior) (Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) 2009; 
Matsumura et al. 2014). According to the estimation of OECD (Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development), on average, climate change will cost the global macro-
economy a 1% to 3.3% reduction in GDP (OECD 2015). In term of likelihood and impact, 
climate change related events are one of the top five global risks the world faces for seven 
consecutive years from 2011 to 2017 (World Economic Forum 2017).1 In a recent technical 
bulletin, the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) reports that climate 
change will significantly affect 93% of the equity market value in the US, totaling $27.5 
trillion, and that these risks cannot be diversified away (SASB 2016).2   
The vast majority of institutional investors (approx. 78%) believe that climate 
change risk is a material risk to their investment portfolios (Institutional Investors Group 
on Climate Change 2011). The attention from institutional investors on climate change has 
increased over 21-fold from 2003 to 2015 (CDP 2015). Despite the increasing interest in 
climate change risk from investors, the disclosure of climate change risk was “scant” and 
“inconsistent” (California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) et al. 2007). 
                                                 
1 Climate change related events include climate change, storms and cyclones, flooding, rising greenhouse 
gas emissions, water supply crises, extreme weather events, major natural disasters, and failure of climate 
change mitigation and adaptation. 
2 http://using.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Climate-Risk-Technical-Bulletin-
101816.pdf?submissionGuid=b614853c-daa9-4fb9-9a73-9791ba84d35c 
In this framework, SASB evaluates the financial impact including revenue, cash flow and opearting, asset 
value and financing impacts. It indentifies the climate change risk from climate regulation, physical effects 
and transition to a low-carbon resilient economy. 
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Meanwhile, institutional investors and other stakeholders have continuously pressured the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to mandate and regulate climate-change 
disclosure.3 Investors argued that “more and better” climate change risk disclosure will 
facilitate their investment decisions (CalPERS et al. 2007, page 2).  
In response to the demands from institutional investors and other stakeholders, the 
SEC issued the Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change 
(SEC FR-82) (guidance hereafter) on February 8, 2010. For the first time, this guidance 
mandated that certain climate change-related issues be disclosed in 10-Ks. Specifically, the 
regulation required disclosure of (1) the impact of climate change legislation and regulation, 
(2) the impact of international accords on climate change, (3) the indirect consequences of 
regulation or business trends, and (4) the physical impacts of climate change. 
The guidance, however, has not been without controversy. Proponents believe the 
guidance to be useful, as the disclosures contain useful information regarding evolving 
climate-related challenges, which historically were opaque (Investor Network for Climate 
Risk 2010). Opponents, on the other hand, argue that the information disclosure is not 
decision-useful (SEC Commissioner Casey 2010). In addition, opponents believe the 
guidance requires firms to comprehensively review climate change matter, which is “both 
unnecessary and excessively burdensome” (Edison Electrical Institute 2010). Similarly, 
Attorney Generals of 14 states (2016) expressed their concerns that climate change 
disclosure will create “a flood of irrelevant information” that “does little to help the 
investors.”4 The 112th Congress even considered repealing the climate disclosure guidance 
                                                 
3 Other stakeholders include state officials, law enforcement, and other non-governmental organizations. 
4 The 14 states include Oklahoma, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-289.pdf 
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as they questioned its effectiveness. However, this guidance is still “alive” and effective to 
date.  
On October 29, 2015, 35 members of Congress wrote a letter to SEC Chair (Mary 
J. White), requesting an update on the 2010 guidance. In this letter, the Congressmen asked 
the SEC the following:  
“What has the SEC done to assess the effectiveness of the Climate Change Guidance in 
providing meaningful disclosures to investors? For example, has the SEC asked investors 
for their thoughts on how the Climate Change Guidance could be improved for their 
benefit?”5 
 
On April 13, 2016, the SEC requested for comments on this guidance in a concept 
release, asking whether the current disclosure is “adequate” to investors to evluate firms’ 
climate change risk. (SEC 2016, page 215).6 
To date, the research on environment risk has focused on the effects of voluntary 
environmental information disclosure. For example, Matsumura et al. (2014) consider the 
effect of carbon emission disclosure on firm value using a survey and document a negative 
relation between firm values and carbon emission. Using a sample from the Australian 
Stock Exchange 200 index, Li et al. (2014) illustrate that the cost of capital is positively 
related to emission intensity. Similarly, using ratings of firms’ corporate social 
responsibility (hereafter, CSR), Chava (2014) finds a positive relationship between firm-
specfic environmental concerns and cost of capital. However, little is known about the 
usefulness of climate change risk disclosure under the mandatory disclosure regime 
implemented by the SEC in 2010. 
                                                 
5 https://cartwright.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/cartwirght-senators-reed-and-schatz-lead-
bicameral-letter-urging-sec-to 
6 The concept release is “Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K” (Release No. 33-
10064; 34-77599; File No. S7-06-16). 
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This paper aims to address this question: is climate change risk disclosure required 
under SEC FR 82 useful to investors? Following the information theory (Lev 1989, page 
156), a message is considered as useful if it can change the receiver’s beliefs (e.g., earnings 
perception), and this change of beliefs triggers a significant action (e.g., change in stock 
price). Accordingly, this paper selects future earnings, earnings persistence, market 
reaction, and forward earnings response coefficient (FERC) as the measures of usefulness.  
Using firm-year observations from the Russell 3000 Index from 2010 to 2014, I 
document several interesting relations between climate risk disclosure and measures of 
disclosure usefulness. First, firms that disclose climate change risk have lower future ROA. 
It appears that profit margin, not the asset turnover, drives this poor performance. Second, 
disclosing firms have lower earnings persistence and a lower forward earnings response 
coefficient (FERC). Third, disclosing firms experience significantly lower short-window 
cumulative abnormal return around the 10-K filing date. This finding is consistent with 
investors incorporating climate change risk information into their investment decisions. 
Additionally, I find that firms with disclosed climate change risk have lower future firm 
value as measured by Tobin’s Q. Taken together, these results suggest climate change risk 
disclosures under SEC FR-82 are useful to investors for assessing firms’ future prospects 
and climate change risk.  
In a subsequent analysis, I apply textual analysis techniques to determine how the 
readability of the disclosure affects the perceptions of investors. Using a climate change 
risk disclosure subsample, I find that the previously described results are accentuated when 
the climate change risk disclosure is less readable. This result indicates that the stock 
market views disclosing companies who may be obscuring their reporting to be riskier.  
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This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this paper provides 
the initial evidence on the usefulness of mandatory climate change disclosure. The results 
suggest that climate change risk disclosure provides decision-relevant information to 
investors. This paper contributes to the current debate on the costs and benefits of this 
specific SEC guidance. The findings of the paper directly respond to Congress’s inquiry 
about the usefulness of the disclosure to investors. Moreover, this paper provides empirical 
evidence in response to the SEC’s request for comment on this guidance. Specifically, my 
results show that the information disclosed under this requirement is useful to investors 
and helps investors to evaluate material climate change risk. 
Second, Leuz and Wysocki (2016) call for more research on the process of how 
regulation arises. This paper reviews the legislative process that led to the SEC 2010 
guidance. I find both institutional investors and Democratic politicians play an active role 
in pressuring the SEC to regulate and mandate climate change disclosure (see more detailed 
discussion in Section 2). The actions of investors and politicians to persuade the SEC is an 
example of interest group theory—groups lobby for or against regulation in their own 
interest (Stigler 1971; Becker 1983; Scott 1997).  
Third, this paper contributes to textual analysis literature. Prior literature 
investigates the effects of textual characteristics (e.g. readability) on firm performance (Li 
2008), earnings persistence (Li 2008), investment efficiency (Biddle et al. 2009), trade 
volume (Miller 2010), analyst forecast (Lehavy et al. 2011) and management forecast 
(Guay et al. 2016). However, most of the previous papers generally focus on the readability 
of the whole 10-K text or management discussion and analysis (hereafter, MD&A). This 
paper, instead, pinpoints a unique section of the 10-K, climate change risk disclosure, and 
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examines whether readability of this disclosure has an important valuation implication. In 
the climate change risk disclosure subsample, this study finds less readable text predicts 
lower future earnings, lower earnings persistence, smaller market reaction, and smaller 
FERC. The results are consistent with managerial obfuscation hypothesis (Li 2008). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
legislative process and summary of SEC 2010 guidance. Section 3 reviews prior studies 
and theory and develop the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the research design including 
sample development and variables measurement. Section 5 presents descriptive statistics 
of main variables and results of each hypothesis. Section 6 provides evidence on additional 
tests. Section 7 provides evidence on robustness checks. Section 8 concludes this study. 
2. Legislative Process and Summary of SEC 2010 Guidance 
In a literature review on financial reporting regulation, Leuz and Wysocki (2016) 
suggest that the researchers should pay more attention to the political process “by which 
disclosure and reporting regulation arises” (Page 601). Interest group theory (Stigler 1971; 
Becker 1983; Scott 1997) suggests that groups lobby for or against regulation in their own 
interest. One example of interest group theory in financial reporting is the lobbying process 
around the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter, SOX 2002). Analyzing 
lobbying process of SOX 2002, Thornburg and Roberts (2008) find that accounting 
profession (AICPA and Big 4 firms) uses political contribution to manage the relation with 
lawmakers and exerts influence on the legislative process. Still under the setting of SOX 
2002, Shapiro and Matson (2008) find that business interests (e.g. Department of 
Commerce and Financial Executive International) lobby Congress to resist or hamper the 
internal control regulation. 
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2.1 Legislative Process 
2.1.1 Prior to 2010: Lobbying from Institutional Investors and Democratic Politicians 
The impact of climate change has grown in significance as extreme weather 
patterns increase in frequency and severity and regulators respond with environmental 
legislation. Increasing environmental regulations impose compliance costs for firms and 
lead to shifts in the demand for products and services.7 Physical climate change risk (e.g., 
extreme weather) interrupts normal operation, logistics, and distribution activities, which 
hurts firm performance. Institutional investors recognized the importance of climate 
change risk and began lobbying the SEC to take action. They sent a petition letter to the 
SEC stating that climate change risk becomes very important to firms and the disclosure 
on that risk should be mandated and included in “securities laws and the Commission’s 
rules” (CalPERS et al. 2007, page 8). 
Starting from 2007, institutional investors and other stakeholders issued 26 petition 
letters lobbying the SEC to mandate climate change disclosure (Appendix A). They 
believed that the ability of investors to evaluate and price the effect of climate change risk 
depends on climate-related information disclosure (CalPERS et al. 2007; BCIMC 2009). 
68 people and entities are signatories on the 26 petitions to the SEC. Politicians (38%) and 
institutional investors (37%) make up the majority of signatories—See Appendix B. All of 
the politicians are affiliated with the Democratic Party. The vast majority of them are State 
Controllers or Treasurers, who are generally the trustees of state pension funds, which 
                                                 
7 As public interests in climate change increases significantly, regulations relating to this issue arise 
gradually. Clean Air Act (1963) is one of the firsts federal law to control air pollution in U.S. In 2007, 
Supreme Court classified carbon dioxide as an air pollutant, which enables EPA started to set new 
regulations on GHG emissions. EPA (2009) issued a proposed role to require mandatory GHG emission 
reporting for large emitting facilities.  
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makes their interests closely aligned to other institutional investors like CalPERS. 
Institutional investors also lobbied Congress to pressure the SEC to regulate climate 
change disclosure. The U.S. Senate Banking Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and 
Investment held a hearing on “Climate Disclosure: Measuring Financial Risks and 
Opportunities” on October 31, 2007. Four witnesses who testified in the hearing believed 
that the SEC should promptly issue regulatory guidance and mandate firms to disclose the 
impact of climate change. 8  On December 6, 2007, Two Senators (Chris Dodd and Jack 
Reed) wrote a letter to SEC Chairman, Christopher Cox, demanding the SEC to issue 
guidance “to ensure that investors have access to material climate change information.”9 
Both Chris Dodd and Jack Reed are Democrats and Christopher Cox is a Republican. 
2.1.2 The year 2010: Dispute about the Guidance in the SEC 
In spite of significant pressure from institutional investors and Congress, the SEC 
was unresponsive to demands for regulating climate change risk disclosure until 2009 when 
Mary Schapiro was appointed Chair. On January 15, 2009, Senator Chris Dodd and Senator 
Jack Reed wrote a second letter to the SEC, again calling for climate change disclosure 
regulation. One year later, on January 27, 2010, the guidance was passed by a slim margin, 
3-2. Chair Mary Schapiro (Independent, but Democratic appointee), Commissioner Elisse 
Walter (Democratic), and Luis Aguilar (Democratic) voted in favor of the guidance, stating 
                                                 
8 The four witnesses include Ms. Mindy Lubber (President of Ceres a sustainability activity organization), 
Mr. Russell Read (Chief Investment Officer, CalPERS), Mr. Jeffery Smith (Environmental Law Partner of 
Cravath, Swaine, and Moore LLP), and Dr. Gary Yohe (Professor of Economics & Environmental Studies, 
Wesleyan University). Please note that Cravath, Swaine, and Moore LLP is a New York and London based 
law firm. 
9 Chris Dodd is the Chair of Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and Senator Jack 
Reed is Chair of Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment. The letter is  available to 
download at http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2007/12/banking-committee-chairman-dodd-
and-securities-subcommittee-chairman-reed-urge-sec-to-issue-guidance-on-disclosure-of-corporate-
climate-risk 
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that the proposed disclosure  requirement would help investors to get “reliable information” 
related to climate change risk and help “investors in their decision making.” 10 , 11 
Commissioners Kathleen Casey (Republican) and Troy Paredes (Republican) who voted 
against the guidance argued, the regulation is totally “unnecessary” and “unrelated to 
investor protection”. 12 
In summary, institutional investors and Democratic politicians play a key role in 
lobbying the SEC to regulate climate change disclosure. Eventually, the SEC passed the 
guidance with a party line vote, indicating the importance of political ideology and party 
politics in the legal process. This legislative process is consistent with interest group theory 
(Stigler 1971; Becker 1983; Scott 1997), which suggests that groups lobby for or against 
regulation in their own interest.  
2.2 Summary of SEC 2010 Guidance 
In the 2010 guidance, the SEC requires all publicly traded companies to disclose 
the following in their 10-K annual reports: (1) the impact of climate change legislation and 
regulation, (2) the impact of international accords on climate change, (3) the indirect 
consequences of regulation or business trends, and (4) the physical impacts of climate 
change. The guidance requires publicly traded companies to disclose climate change 
information in the following sections of their 10-K annual reports: (1) Item 101: 
Description of Business, (2) Item 103: Legal Proceedings, (3) Item 503: Risk Factors, and 
(4) Item 303: Management’s Discussion and Analysis.13 
                                                 
10 https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch012710mls-climate.htm 
11 http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch012710laa-climate.htm. 
12 https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch012710klc-climate.htm 
13 See the SEC’s Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Final Rule, 
February 8, 2010, available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106fr.pdf 
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3. Theory, Literature, and Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Climate Change Risk and Future Performance  
Climate change risk may influence future performance in many ways. First, 
regulatory risk, i.e., emerging environmental regulations regarding climate change, can 
lead to significant increases in compliance and energy costs, adversely affecting future 
profitability. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has issued a series of 
regulations on carbon emission that address climate change, since 2009. 14  Those 
regulations cost U.S. economy an estimated $353 billion annually (Young 2012). To meet 
the regulation requirements, firms direct more resources towards emission control, which 
increases operating costs and reduces profits. In addition, EPA regulations lead to 
significant increases in energy costs. The average retail electricity rate increases an 
estimated 11% to 14% annually, due in large part to the EPA’s Clean Power Plan (NERA 
2015).15  At the state-level, Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) programs’ Cap-and-
Trade systems, and Carbon Tax Schemes were issued in 37 states to reduce carbon 
emission, significantly increasing corporate compliance, energy, and operating costs.16, 17, 
                                                 
14 These regulations include “Clean Power Plan Rule”, National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants, “GHG Tailoring Rule (2010)” “Cross-State Air Pollution” “The National Program for 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GHG) and Fuel Economy Standards” “Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration”  
15 NERA Economic Consulting, 2015, Energy and Consumer Impacts of EPA’s Clean Power Plan, 
http://www.americaspower.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/NERA-CPP-Final-Nov-7.pdf 
16 By 2016, 37 states have adopted or enacted mandatory RPS programs, requiring a certain percentage of 
renewable electricity generation (electric power comes from renewable sources) (NCSL, 2016). These new 
regulations force firms to seek renewable or clean energy supply. However, the cost of renewable energy is 
much higher than fossil fuel (e.g., Coal, Gasoline, and Natural Gas), thus, negatively impact firms’ 
performance.  
17 Under the framework of “Global Warming Solutions Act” (2006), California launched a cap-and-trade 
program in 2012, which allows trade firms carbon emission allowance. California firms has paid 1.12 and 
3.40 billion to buy the carbon emission credit in year 2014 and 2015, respectively, clearly increasing firms’ 
operating costs. Details are available on 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/results_summary.pdf 
11 
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In its 2013 10-K, Ford Motor Company stated: 
“If the agencies seek to impose and enforce extreme fuel economy or GHG standards in 
spite of unfavorable market conditions or inadequate technology development, we likely 
would be forced to take various actions that could have substantial adverse effects on our 
sales volume and profits.”19 
 
Costco Wholesale Corp. stated similar concerns in 2013 10-K: 
 
“Increased U.S. and foreign government and agency regulations to limit carbon dioxide 
and other greenhouse gas emissions may result in increased compliance costs and 
legislation or regulation affecting energy inputs that could materially affect our 
profitability.” 
 
Second, physical climate change risk (e.g., extreme weather) can interrupt normal 
operations and disrupt logistics and distribution (Lowitt 2014), increasing both operating 
and non-operating cost (e.g., repairing cost or replacement cost) (Risky Business Project 
2016).20  
Wal-Mart made a similar disclosure of the impact of physical climate change risk 
in its 2011 10-K: 
“The occurrence of one or more natural disasters, such as hurricanes, cyclones, typhoons, 
tropical storms, floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, weather conditions such as major or 
extended winter storms, droughts and tornados, whether as a result of climate change or 
otherwise, severe changes in climate and geo-political events in a country in which we 
operate or in which our suppliers are located could adversely affect our operations and 
financial performance.” 
 
                                                 
18 As of year 2016, California and some counties of Colorado, Maryland and Washington have 
implemented carbon tax, aiming at reduction of carbon emission. Moreover, based on a research from 
Institute of Energy Research (2009), this cap-and-trade program will increase significantly increase energy 
price. 
19 GHG means Greenhouse Gas. 
20 In a letter to SEC Secretary, Risky Business Project (2016) mentioned the following examples of how 
physical climate parameter affect U.S. economy. For example, “Agricultural companies: Extreme weather 
events, heat, and humidity can materially affect the industry's production efficiency and supply chain. 
Commercial and residential real estate: Sea level rise and increased storms are expected to have significant 
consequences on coastal property and infrastructure. Manufacturing industry: Dangerous levels of extreme 
heat and rising seas may cause large disruptions in supply chain operations and labor productivity—
especially as many manufacturing plants are located in high-risk areas such as the Southeast.” 
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Time Warner Cable Inc. explained the impact of physical climate change in their 
2013 10-K: 
“TWC's network and information systems are also vulnerable to damage or interruption 
from power outages, natural disasters (including extreme weather arising from short-term 
weather patterns or any long-term changes)…. Any of these events could have an adverse 
impact on TWC and its customers, including degradation of service, service disruption, 
excessive call volume to call centers and damage to TWC's plant, equipment, data, and 
reputation. ”  
 
Third, other risk related to climate change includes decreased consumers demand 
for goods or services with heavy greenhouse gas emissions, and potential reputation loss 
due to violating climate change regulations, emission activities, or negative public 
perception.21 Clearly, reduced product demand will adversely affect firms’ future earnings. 
Moreover, loss in reputation may lead to decreased product demand and induce tightened 
scrutiny, both of which adversely affect firms’ operations.  
FedEx mentioned the other risk of climate change in its 10-K of 2013: 
“Moreover, even without such regulation, increased awareness and any adverse publicity 
in the global marketplace about the GHGs emitted by companies in the airline and 
transportation industries could harm our reputation and reduce customer demand for our 
services, especially our air express services.”  
 
Based on the descriptions provided by the corporations in their 10-Ks, it is clear 
that exposure to climate change risk (i.e., regulatory risk, physical climate change risk, and 
other risk) has adverse effects on the exposed firms. From this, I propose the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: Firms with disclosed climate change risk have poorer future financial 
performance.  
   
                                                 
21 One famous example of reputation loss due to climate change is Volkswagen emissions scandal (2015). 
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3.2 Climate Change Risk and Uncertainty  
The extant literature in both accounting and economics emphasizes that the 
operational environment places multiple constraints upon the firm (Child 1972; 
Govindarajan 1984). The external environment can influence firms’ information systems 
and organizational structure (Gordon and Narayanan 1984). Environmental uncertainty 
theory predicts that variances in earnings increase as external uncertainty increases 
(Milliken 1987). Ghosh and Olsen (2009) examine how environmental uncertainty impacts 
on earnings variance. Measuring environmental uncertainty with the variation of sales and 
analysts’ forecast dispersion, they find a positive correlation between environmental 
uncertainty and earnings variance. Climate change risk—regulatory risk, physical risk, and 
other risk—creates external uncertainty (Chava 2014; Matsumura et al. 2014).  
From the regulatory risk perspective, many policies relating to climate change are 
in their infancy which creates greater uncertainty. “During these early stages, climate 
change policy uncertainty is high, perhaps at its peak” (IEA 2007). Specifically, existing 
climate change regulation might be modified or newly adopted. Regulatory changes lead 
to varied requirements with different compliance costs. Since firm operations are subject 
to these regulations, greater climate regulation uncertainties may lead to higher earnings 
volatility and lower earnings persistence. 
Alpha Natural Resources, Inc. described the effects of regulation uncertainty in its 
2013 10-K: 
“Considerable uncertainty is associated with these GHG emissions initiatives. The content 
of new treaties or legislation is not yet determined and many of the new regulatory 
initiatives remain subject to review by the agencies or the courts. ” 
 
Woodward Inc. stated the effects of regulation uncertainty in its 2014 10-K: 
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“We expect the uncertainty regarding government renewable mandates and subsidies will 
contribute to continued volatility in the renewable energy industry.”  
 
From the physical risk perspective, Blackrock (2015) suggests that weather patterns 
become harder to predict as climates become more extreme. Moreover, a changing climate 
makes natural disasters less predictable and exposes the firm’s operations and supply chain 
to environmental uncertainty. Due to increasingly unpredictable weather patterns, physical 
climate change risk significantly affects firm operations, leading to more volatile and 
unpredictable earnings.  
In its 2013 10-K, ARC Group Worldwide disclosed the impact of physical risk: 
“In addition, over the past several years, changing weather patterns and climatic 
conditions, such as global warming, have added to the unpredictability and frequency of 
natural disasters in certain parts of the world and created additional uncertainty as to 
future trends and exposures.” 
 
The Federated National Holding Co states the uncertainty of physical risk in its 
2014 10-K:  
“The occurrence of claims from catastrophic events could result in substantial volatility in 
our results of operations or financial condition for any fiscal quarter or year.” 
 
From other risk perspective, the interaction between climate change and consumer 
behaviors, and business trends also brings higher uncertainty to firm operations.  
As Pacific Ethanol stated the uncertainties generated from other climate change risk 
in its 2013 10-K: 
“Future demand for ethanol is uncertain and may be affected by changes to federal 
mandates, public perception, consumer acceptance and overall consumer demand for 
transportation fuel.” 
 
Dichev and Tang (2009) investigate the relationship between earnings volatility and 
earnings predictability. They find that earnings predictability decreases when earnings 
volatility increases. In summary, potential regulation, unpredictable weather patterns, and 
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changes in consumer behaviors and business trends increase the uncertainty of firm 
operations, making earnings less predictable. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: Firms with disclosed climate change risk have lower earnings persistence. 
 
3.3 Climate Change Risk and Market Reaction  
Empirical research suggests that stock price reflects changes in investors’ valuation 
of the firm (Lambert 1996; Holthausen and Watts 2001). Valuation theory also suggests 
firm performance (e.g., earnings, cash flows, and dividend policy) and risk are two 
determinants of stock price or firm value (Miller and Modigliani 1961; Lang and Stulz 
1994; Ohlson 1995; Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 2005). More specifically, the stock price 
is positively correlated with firm performance and negatively correlated with firm risk. 
Using a theoretical model, Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) find that expected EPS and 
EPS growth is positively correlated with stock price. Moreover, the prior literature suggests 
that one of the important determinants of firm risk is earnings persistence (Easton and 
Zmijewski 1989; Collins and Kothari 1989). As discussed in sections 3.1 and 3.2, firms 
that disclose climate change risk have poorer financial performance and lower earnings 
persistence, both of which lead to lower stock price. Since the guidance requires firms to 
disclose the climate change risk in annual reports (e.g. 10-Ks), I expect that market reaction 
to be more negative for firms with disclosed climate change risk during 10-K filing period. 
Based on the above arguments, I propose the third hypothesis: 
H3: Firms with disclosed climate change risk experience more negative market 
reaction, during 10-K filing period. 
 
3.4 Climate Change Risk and Forward Earnings Responses Coefficients (FERC) 
Prior literature (Collins and Kothari 1989; Teoh and Wong 1993; Teets and Wasley 
1996; Lennox and Park 2006; Wilson 2008; Chan et al. 2012; Mian and 
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Sankaraguruswamy 2012) examines the relationship between earnings and 
contemporaneous return (current ERC). In my paper, I focus on the forward earnings 
responses coefficients, which means the relationship between future earnings and current 
returns. Climate change is usually consided as one type of exougenous shocks (Eboli et al. 
2010; Leichenko 2011; Wheeler and Von Braun 2013). As Tucker and Zarowin (2006) 
demonstrate, a shock influences changes in future earnings but may not affect current 
earnings. Clearly, climate change is more related to future uncertainty and may affect 
FERC, not current ERC.  
Following rational structural uncertainty theory, Brav and Heaton (2002) argue that 
investors usually places less weight on the more uncertain signals. Francis et al. (2007) 
examine the post-earnings-announcement-drift (PEAD) under the rational structural 
uncertainty theory. They find that PEAD could be partly explained by the higher 
information uncertainty of stocks. Consistent with the arguments in Brav and Heaton (2002) 
and Francis et al. (2007), firms that disclose climate change risk have future earnings with 
high information uncertainty. Thus, investors may place less weight on the future earnings 
information of these firms, leading to a lower FERC. 
Based on the above arguments, I propose the fourth hypothesis: 
H4: Firms with disclosed climate change risk have lower FERC. 
4. Research Design 
4.1 Sample Selection 
On July 2014, a free web tool was created by Ceres and CookESG to provide the 
climate change disclosure excerpts from public firms’ SEC filings.22 Through this web tool, 
                                                 
22 http://tools.ceres.org/resources/tools/sec-sustainability-disclosure/@@ceres-search-s3 
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the public can easily access and obtain the climate change disclosure information and 
according categories, including regulatory risk/impact, physical risk/impact, non-specific 
climate disclosure, and renewable energy/clean technology/energy efficiency. My initial 
sample of Russell 3000 index firms is taken from the Ceres and CookESG Research 
website from 2010 to 2014. The Russell 3000 index is comprised of 98% of the US equity 
market capitalization. 2010 is chosen as the initial year because the guidance is effective 
for fiscal years ending after February 8, 2010. I end the sample collection in 2014 because 
several of my forward-looking and financial data availability analyses end in 2015. In 
constructing the sample, I remove all financial service industries (SIC 6000-6999) 
observations since their financial reporting differ from non-financial firms. Next, I delete 
all observations with insufficient data to calculate the dependent and control variables. The 
final sample consists of 8,797 to 9,264 firm-year observations, depending on different 
models. This represents a 30.31% to 33.83% reduction from the initial sample. 
4.2 Climate Change Risk Disclosure  
4.2.1 Dichotomous Climate Change Risk 
In the 2010 guidance, the SEC requires firms to disclose impact of legislation and 
regulation, international accord, indirect consequences of regulation or business trends, and 
physical impacts of climate change in firms’ annual report. Since climate change risk refers 
to the risks driven by regulation, physical climate parameters and other climate-related 
development (CDP 2009; Matsumura et al. 2014), I manually classify the climate change 
disclosure into three risk categories: regulatory risk (including international or domestic 
regulation), physical risk, and other risk.  
Regulatory Risk equals one if a firm reports being subject to climate change 
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regulation, which includes but is not limited to EPA’s regulations, Clean Air Act, 
Renewable Energy Act, Paris Agreement, Kyoto Protocol, renewable portfolio standard 
(RPS), European Union Emission Trading System, Cross-State Air Pollution Rules, United 
Kingdom's Carbon Reduction Commitment, emissions trading schemes, and carbon tax or 
carbon fees, and zero otherwise. Physical Risk equals one if a firm reports being subject to 
a physical climate change risk, which includes but is not limited to floods, hurricanes, 
droughts, storms, water availability, extreme temperatures, temperatures change, severe 
weather, sea level change, or change of these weather conditions, and zero otherwise. Other 
Risk equals one if a firm reports being subject to other climate change risk, which includes 
but is not limited to business trends, changing consumer preference or behavior, potential 
reputation loss, and other climate change related matters, and zero otherwise. Climate 
Change Risk equals one if a firm discloses any climate change risk, including Regulatory 
Risk, Physical Risk, and Other Risk, and zero otherwise.  
As this paper mentioned in Section 4.1, Ceres and CookESG Research provide four 
types categories of climate disclosure: non-specific climate disclosure, regulatory 
risk/impact, physical risk/impact, renewable energy/clean technology/energy efficiency. I 
do not directly use these provided categories as the proxy of climate change risk due to 
potential misclassification. First, the website consistently classifies certain keywords as 
some type of climate change risk but actually they are not. For example, it classifies 
“materially adversely affect/impact” as regulatory risk.23 Again, even when a firm claims 
“at this time we do not expect any of these new laws, regulations or activities to have 
a material adverse effect on our results of operations, financial condition or long-term 
                                                 
23 E.g., See the 10-K excerpt of annual report of AutoNation Inc (Ticker: AN) of year 2013. 
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liquidity,” the website still classifies the firm as “regulatory risk”.24 Second, the website 
does not distinguish risk from opportunity. For example, Emcore Corp disclosed the 
following in its 2012 annual report: “We believe the market for terrestrial solar 
power generation solutions will grow as solar power generation technologies improve in 
efficiency, as global prices for non-renewable energy sources (i.e., fossil fuels) continue to 
fluctuate, and as concern over the effects of fossil fuel-based carbon emissions on global 
warming grows.” One primary segment of this company is solar power generation. Clearly, 
this disclosure indicates climate change will bring opportunity for this firm. However, the 
website classifies this as “Non-Specific Climate Disclosure.” Directly using “Non-Specific 
Climate Disclosure” as a measure of climate change risk is problematic.25 
4.2.2 Descriptive Statistics of Climate Change Risk 
Figure 1 reports the percentage of firms that disclose climate change risk in SEC 
10K filing. From this figure, I find that over half of observations disclose at least one type 
of climate change risk. Among the three types of climate change risks, the most frequent 
risk is physical risk, followed by regulatory and other risk. Before 2014, there is a clear 
increasing trend of disclosure of climate change risk, indicating more firms realize the 
importance of the impact of climate change. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 This 10-K excerpt is from annual report of Owens Corning (Ticker: OC) of year 2012. 
25 In a robustness check, I also tried to use website provided categories as the measures of climate change 
risk. For example, I identify “regulatory risk/impact” as regulatory risk, “physical risk/impact” as physical 
risk, and “non-specific climate disclosure” as other risk. In general, I find qualitatively and quantitatively 
similar results. 
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Figure 1  
Percentage of Firms that Disclose Climate Change Risk in SEC 10K filing 
 
Figure 2  
Percentage of Firms that Disclose Climate Change Risk by Fama-French Industry 
(2010-2014) 
 
Code Fama-French Industry  Percentage  Code Fama-French Industry  Percentage 
1 Agriculture 74.36%  23 Automobiles and Trucks 57.65% 
2  Food Products 75.12%  24 Aircraft 52.86% 
3 Candy & Soda 88.57%  25 Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 65.00% 
4 Beer & Liquor 60.00%  26 Defense 41.67% 
5 Tobacco Products 80.00%  27 Precious Metals 78.26% 
6 Recreation 21.57%  28 Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 89.47% 
7  Entertainment 64.90%  29 Coal 100.00% 
8 Printing and Publishing 14.06%  30 Petroleum and Natural Gas 95.53% 
9 Consumer Goods 42.07%  31 Utilities 98.30% 
10 Apparel 60.43%  32  Communication 29.01% 
11 Healthcare 45.03%  33 Personal Services 26.97% 
12 Medical Equipment 16.14%  34 Business Services 20.43% 
13 Pharmaceutical Products 11.80%  35 Computers 30.82% 
14 Chemicals 85.71%  36 Electronic Equipment 44.43% 
15  Rubber and Plastic Products 68.75%  37 Measuring and Control Equipment 35.55% 
16 Textiles 48.28%  38 Business Supplies 50.00% 
17 Construction Materials 67.54%  39 Shipping Containers 100.00% 
18  Construction 80.51%  40 Transportation 89.50% 
19 Steel Works Etc 81.68%  41 Wholesale 55.21% 
20 Fabricated Products 44.00%  42 Retail 62.50% 
21 Machinery 60.97%  43 Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 76.17% 
22 Electrical Equipment 60.93%  48  Other  74.51% 
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Figure 2 reports the percentage of firms that disclose climate change risk by Fama-
French 48-industry. The five lowest climate change risk industries are pharmaceutical 
products, printing and publishing, medical equipment, business services, and recreation. 
On the contrary, the five highest climate change risk industries are coal, shipping containers, 
utilities, petroleum and natural gas, and transportation. The considerable variance of 
climate change risk across Fama-French industries suggests the need for controlling 
industry fixed effects.  In addition, this big variation in climate change risk across Fama-
French industries is generally consistent with my expectation: climate sensitive and heavy 
emission industries are more likely to disclose climate change risk in their annual reports. 
4.2.3 Fog Index of Climate Change Disclosure 
To further investigate the effects of the readability of climate change disclosure on 
the dependent variables, following Li (2008) and Lehavy et al. (2011), I measure the 
readability of climate change disclosure texts (obtained via Ceres and CookESG Research) 
using fog index: 
Fog Index = 0.4*(Average words per sentence + Percent of complex words)         (1) 
where the complex word refers to one with three or more syllables. Higher fog index thus 
indicates less readability. Fog index is scaled by 100 for ease of interpretation of 
coefficients. 
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5. Tests and Results 
5.1 Climate Change Risk and Future Performance 
 To test Hypothesis 1, I follow Gunny (2010) and estimate two equations to 
determine the relation between climate change and future performance. Model (2) is shown 
below: 
AdjROAt+1 = a0 + a1Climate Change Risk Measurest + a2AdjROAt + a3Ln (Assets)t  
            + a5Returnt + a6Z-Scoret-1 + IND +YEAR+ εt+1                                                (2) 
 
where  t refers to the fiscal year. There are four climate change risk measures as defined 
above: Climate Change Risk, Regulatory Risk, Physical Risk, and Other Risk. AdjROAt is 
the industry-adjusted ROA, which equals firm-specific ROA minus the median ROA for 
firms in the same Fama-French 48 industry and year.26 Following Gunny (2010), this paper 
uses industry-median adjusted to control the performance variances related to industry 
characteristics. ROA is calculated as income before extraordinary items (IB) divided by 
lagged total assets (AT). Ln(ASSETS) is the natural logarithm of total assets (AT). MB is 
the market to book ratio, which equals the market value of equity divided by book value of 
equity (CEQ). Return is the buy-and-hold return in year t. Z-Score is a financial health 
measure. To control for industry and year fixed effects, I also include industry and year 
indicators.  
As discussed in Section 3.1, the effective or proposed regulations could lead to 
additional compliance costs, adversely affecting firms profit margins (net income/net sales). 
Moreover, new legislation related to climate change may also influence the demand for 
current products (e.g., fossil fuels or gasoline car), which affects assets turnover (net 
sales/total assets). Extreme weather also interrupts firms’ normal operation, logistics, and 
                                                 
26 Using two digit SIC industry code does not change the results. 
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distribution, which increases operating cost and decreases assets turnover ratio. To further 
exploit the channels between climate change risk and future performance, following 
DuPont analysis, I decompose ROA into two parts: Profit Margin and Assets Turnover, 
and replace ROA with these two parts in the following model (3): 
AdjProfit Margint+1 or AdjAssetsTurnovert+1 = a0 + a1Climate Change Risk 
Measurest + a2AdjProfit Margint or AdjAssetsTurnovert + a3Ln (Assets)t + a4MBt  
            + a5Returnt + a6Z-Scoret-1 + IND +YEAR + εt+1                               (3) 
 
Panel A Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the main variables, including 
dependent, independent, and control variables. The mean and median of AdjROAt+1 are 
0.002 and 0.001, respectively. Approximately 52.5% of the firm-year observations in my 
sample disclose at least one type of climate change risk (Climate Change Risk). 33.8%, 
42.4% and 25.5% of firm-year observations have regulatory, physical risk, and other risk 
related to climate change, respectively. With regard to the control variables, on average, 
firms have Assets of $5455.34 million (untabulated), Ln (Assets)t of 7.230, Market to Book 
ratio (MB) of 3.387, Return of 0.226, and Z-score of 1.243, respectively. The descriptive 
statistics are quantitatively similar to the previous studies (e.g., Gunny 2010).  
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Table 1 
Climate-Change Risk and Future Performance 
 
This table presents the regression results of the impact of climate change risk on future performance. 
Regressions include the year and industry fixed effects. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on 
standard errors that are heteroskedasticity robust. To conserve space, I do not report the coefficient estimates 
for the year and industry dummies. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels (two-tailed), respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
 
Panel A Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean SD 25% Median 75% 
AdjROAt+1 9,132 0.002 0.066 -0.036 0.001 0.042 
AdjProfit Margint+1 9,132 0.001 0.086 -0.040 0.000 0.051 
AdjAssets Turnovert+1 9,132 0.091 0.401 -0.214 0.005 0.342 
Climate Change Risk   9,132 0.525 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Regulatory Risk 9,132 0.338 0.473 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Physical Risk 9,132 0.424 0.494 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Other Risk 9,132 0.255 0.436 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Fog Index   4,793 0.244 0.082 0.197 0.238 0.314 
AdjROAt 9,132 0.003 0.146 -0.034 0.001 0.043 
AdjProfit Margint 9,132 -0.214 1.615 -0.038 0.001 0.050 
AdjAssets Turnovert 9,132 0.126 0.618 -0.231 0.001 0.345 
Ln (Assets)t 9,132 7.230 1.730 5.945 7.147 8.415 
MBt 9,132 3.387 5.286 1.436 2.300 3.934 
Returnt 9,132 0.226 0.523 -0.068 0.138 0.392 
Z-Scoret-1 9,132 1.243 2.661 0.675 1.547 2.529 
 
The results of the impact of climate change risk on future performance are reported 
in Table 1, Panel B. The variables of primary interest in Panel B are climate change risk 
variables: Climate Change Risk, Regulatory Risk, Physical Risk, and Other Risk. Column 
(1) finds that Climate Change Risk is negatively related to future performance (coefficient 
=-0.002, t=-2.02). It means, compared to firms without disclosed climate change risk, the 
AdjROAt+1 of firms with disclosed climate change risk is -0.002 lower, which equals 100% 
of the sample mean of AdjROAt+1, which is also 0.002. The economic significance is non-
trivial. Columns (2) – (4) indicate that Regulatory Risk, Physical Risk, and Other Risk are 
negatively associated with future performance as well. Taken together, these results are 
consistent with hypothesis 1 that firms with disclosed climate change risk have poorer 
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future performance. 
 
Table 1(continued) 
 
Panel B Climate-Change Risk and Future Performance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Pred. AdjROAt+1  AdjROAt+1  AdjROAt+1  AdjROAt+1  
Climate Change Risk   - -0.002**    
  (-2.02)    
Regulatory Risk  -  -0.005***   
    (-3.90)   
Physical Risk -   -0.002*  
    (-1.68)  
Other Risk -    -0.003** 
     (-1.98) 
AdjROAt + 0.235*** 0.235*** 0.235*** 0.235*** 
  (29.99) (29.95) (30.01) (30.00) 
Ln (Assets)t + 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** 
  (2.56) (3.00) (2.43) (2.55) 
MBt + 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (5.44) (5.41) (5.44) (5.45) 
Returnt + 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
  (10.39) (10.42) (10.40) (10.39) 
Z-Scoret-1 + 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
  (8.44) (8.40) (8.43) (8.40) 
Intercept  -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (-0.19) (-0.33) (-0.22) (-0.35) 
IND/YEAR    YES YES YES YES 
No. of observations  9,132 9,132 9,132 9,132 
Adj. R2  0.416 0.416 0.416 0.416 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Panel C Climate Change Risk and Future Performance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables Pred. 
AdjProfit 
Margint+1 
AdjProfit 
Margint+1 
AdjProfit 
Margint+1 
AdjProfit 
Margint+1 
AdjAssets 
Turnovert+1 
AdjAssets 
Turnovert+1 
AdjAssets 
Turnovert+1 
AdjAssets 
Turnovert+1 
Climate Change 
Risk   
- -0.003*    0.007    
  (-1.91)    (1.20)    
Regulatory Risk  -  -0.009***    0.009   
    (-4.66)    (1.46)   
Physical Risk -   -0.002    -0.003  
    (-1.27)    (-0.52)  
Other Risk -    -0.005***    -0.003 
     (-2.80)    (-0.47) 
AdjProfit Margint + 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012***     
  (17.07) (17.05) (17.05) (17.04)     
AdjAssets Turnovert +     0.501*** 0.501*** 0.501*** 0.501*** 
      (63.57) (63.59) (63.59) (63.66) 
Ln (Assets)t + 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 
  (22.00) (22.34) (22.02) (22.12) (-19.33) (-19.37) (-19.25) (-19.01) 
MBt + 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 
  (3.52) (3.48) (3.53) (3.53) (1.92) (1.93) (1.90) (1.90) 
Returnt + 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 
  (11.66) (11.68) (11.66) (11.64) (2.09) (2.08) (2.08) (2.07) 
Z-Scoret-1 + 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
  (19.44) (19.33) (19.43) (19.37) (7.75) (7.77) (7.75) (7.73) 
Intercept  -0.082*** -0.083*** -0.082*** -0.083*** 0.206*** 0.208*** 0.210*** 0.209*** 
  (-7.01) (-7.20) (-7.06) (-7.18) (5.55) (5.60) (5.64) (5.63) 
IND/YEAR    YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of observations  9,132 9,132 9,132 9,132 9,132 9,132 9,132 9,132 
Adj. R2  0.250 0.251 0.250 0.250 0.708 0.708 0.708 0.708 
 
            In Model (3), I decompose ROA into profit margin and assets turnover and report 
the results in Table 1, Panel C. Column (1) reports the results of regressing AdjProfit 
Margint+1 on Climate Change Risk. The results show that climate change risk has a 
significantly adverse effect on AdjProfit Margint+1, suggesting firms with disclosed climate 
change risk have lower future profit margins. The results in Columns (2) to (4) confirm the 
findings in Column (1). The results for asset turnover, reported in Columns (5) to (8) are 
all insignificant. In summary, it appears that the negative relation between climate change 
risk and future ROA are primarily a function of declining profit margins rather than 
declining asset turnovers. As the hypotheses development part shows, most of the effects 
from climate change risk on earnings are cost or expenditure-related. For example, 
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governmental regulation relating GHG could increase compliance expense and energy cost, 
which could reduce the gross profit margins but might not influence assets turnover. 
Physical climate change risk increases operating and non-operating cost of firms, which is 
also related to profit margins. 
Table 1 (continued) 
 
Panel D Readability of Climate Change Risk Disclosure and Future Performance 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Pred. AdjROAt+1  AdjProfit Margint+1 
AdjAssets 
Turnovert+1 
Fog Index   - -0.013* -0.043*** -0.202*** 
  (-1.75) (-3.62) (-5.44) 
AdjROAt + 0.396***   
  (24.44)   
AdjProfit Margint +  0.029***  
   (4.57)  
AdjAssets Turnovert +   0.501*** 
    (42.85) 
Ln (Assets)t +/- 0.000 0.010*** -0.031*** 
  (1.09) (13.52) (-13.13) 
MBt + 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
  (8.37) (7.24) (3.64) 
Returnt + 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.032*** 
  (9.50) (8.78) (3.80) 
Z-Scoret-1 + 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.013*** 
  (8.70) (9.67) (3.29) 
Intercept  -0.005 -0.073*** 0.255*** 
  (-0.57) (-5.76) (5.11) 
IND/YEAR    YES YES YES 
No. of observations  4793 4793 4793 
Adj. R2  0.460 0.193 0.741 
 
Panel D of Table 1 reports the relation between readability of climate change risk 
disclosure texts and future performance in the disclosing subsample. The results show that 
Fog Index is negatively correlated with AdjROAt+1, AdjProfit Margint+1, and AdjAssets 
Turnovert+1 for disclosing firms. Overall, the results are consistent with managerial 
obfuscation hypothesis (Li 2008). Managers are inclined to obfuscate information in the 
10-K when their firms have lower expected future performance, thus increasing the 
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information process cost to investors. In contrast, companies with better future 
performance are likely to have more readable annual reports, distinguishing them from 
other less readable peers. 
5.2 Climate Change Risk and Earnings Persistence 
Following Li (2008), this paper constructs a model to test hypothesis 2 regarding 
the relation between earnings persistence and the measures of climate change risk. 
ROAt+1 = a0 + a1Climate Change Risk Measurest + a2ROAt  
           + a3Climate Change Risk Measurest *ROAt + a4Ln (MV)t + a5MBt  
           + a6DIVt + a7STD(ROA)t + a8STD(RET)t + a9Firm Aget  
           + a10SIt + a11M&At + a12DEt +IND + YEAR + εt+1                            (4) 
 
where t refers to the fiscal year. Ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of market value in the 
fiscal year end. MB is market to book ratio. DIV is an indicator variable that equals one if 
a firm distributes dividend (DVT) in fiscal year t, and zero otherwise. STD(ROA) equals 
the standard deviation of the ROA in the last five fiscal years. STD(RET) equals the 
standard deviation of the monthly stock returns (RET) in the year t-1, Firm Age is the 
natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm appears in Compustat. SI equals 
special items (SPI) divided by lagged total assets (AT). M&A is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the firm is involved in mergers or acquisitions (AQC), and zero otherwise. 
DE is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm is incorporated in Delaware in fiscal 
year t, and zero otherwise. 
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Table 2 
Climate Change Risk and Earnings Persistence 
 
This table presents the regression results of the impact of climate change risk on earnings persistence. 
Regressions include the year and industry fixed effects. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on 
standard errors that are heteroskedasticity robust. To conserve space, I do not report the coefficient estimates 
for the year and industry dummies. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels (two-tailed), respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
 
Panel A Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean SD 25% Median 75% 
ROAt+1 9,126 0.023 0.154 0.007 0.047 0.089 
Climate Change Risk 9,126 0.521 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Regulatory Risk 9,126 0.333 0.471 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Physical Risk 9,126 0.421 0.494 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Other Risk 9,126 0.251 0.433 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Fog Index 4,757 0.288 0.215 0.197 0.238 0.316 
ROA 9,126 0.025 0.169 0.011 0.049 0.092 
Ln(MV) 9,126 7.325 1.565 6.157 7.213 8.406 
MB 9,126 3.391 5.301 1.450 2.331 3.996 
DIV 9,126 0.491 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 
STD(ROA) 9,126 0.089 0.158 0.019 0.040 0.089 
STD(RET) 9,126 0.102 0.052 0.065 0.092 0.127 
Firm Age 9,126 3.011 0.736 2.485 2.996 3.638 
SI 9,126 -0.004 0.660 -0.013 -0.003 0.000 
M&A 9,126 0.467 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 
DE 9,126 0.653 0.476 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Panel A Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the main variables, including 
dependent, independent, and control variables. Table 2, Panel B, reports the relation 
between climate change risk and earnings persistence. Consistent with hypothesis 2, the 
results in column (1) find that firms with disclosed climate change risk have lower earnings 
persistence than firms without (coefficient = -0.069, t = -1.96). This result suggests that 
climate change risk introduces uncertainty into a firm’s earnings, making future earnings 
less predictable. Columns (2) - (4) consistently show similar evidence. I also examine the 
economic significance of climate change risk on earnings persistence. Compared to firms 
without disclosed climate change risk, the earnings persistence of firms with disclosed 
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climate change risk is 12.54% lower.27 This demonstrates that climate change risk has a 
significant economic impact on earnings persistence. 
Next, I examine the relation between climate change risk disclosure readability on 
earnings persistence. The results reported in Panel C in Table 3 find that the coefficients 
on ROAt * Fog Index are significantly negative columns (1), indicating that firms with 
lower readability in climate change risk disclosure have lower earnings persistence. These 
results are consistent with Li (2008), who finds that firms with less readable 10-Ks have 
lower earnings persistence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 The economic significance equals 0.069/(0.619-0.069))=12.54% 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
Panel B Climate Change Risk and Earnings Persistence 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Pred. ROAt+1 ROAt+1 ROAt+1 ROAt+1 
ROAt + 0.619*** 0.614*** 0.608*** 0.610*** 
  (34.01) (35.76) (33.28) (35.27) 
Climate Change Risk   ? 0.001    
  (0.36)    
ROAt *Climate Change Risk   - -0.069**    
  (-1.96)    
Regulatory Risk   0.001   
   (0.14)   
ROAt * Regulatory Risk -  -0.110**   
   (-2.26)   
Physical Risk     -0.001  
    (-0.50)  
ROAt * Physical Risk -   -0.029  
    (-0.79)  
Other Risk     0.002 
     (0.79) 
ROAt * Other Risk -    -0.102** 
     (-2.57) 
Ln(MV) + 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
  (6.86) (7.00) (6.58) (6.77) 
MB + 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (3.12) (3.01) (3.10) (3.07) 
DIV + 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 
  (1.14) (1.28) (1.13) (1.26) 
STD(ROA) - -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.057*** -0.056*** 
  (-3.27) (-3.36) (-3.35) (-3.35) 
STD(RET) - -0.173*** -0.171*** -0.173*** -0.171*** 
  (-4.64) (-4.59) (-4.63) (-4.59) 
Firm Age ? -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.24) (-0.18) (-0.24) (-0.28) 
SI - -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
  (-3.61) (-3.61) (-3.51) (-3.53) 
M&A - -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
  (-1.37) (-1.37) (-1.30) (-1.38) 
DE - -0.006*** -0.005** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
  (-2.66) (-2.55) (-2.61) (-2.60) 
Intercept  0.031*** 0.028** 0.032*** 0.029** 
  (2.64) (2.50) (2.77) (2.57) 
IND/YEAR    YES YES YES YES 
No. of observations  9,126 9,126 9,126 9,126 
Adj. R2  0.631 0.631 0.630 0.631 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
Panel C Readability of Climate-Change Risk Disclosure and Earnings Persistence 
  (1) 
Variables Pred. ROAt+1 
ROAt + 0.665*** 
  (28.04) 
Fog Index   ? -0.004 
  (-0.80) 
ROAt * Fog Index   - -0.146* 
  (-1.89) 
Ln(MV) + 0.002*** 
  (2.80) 
MB + 0.002*** 
  (7.08) 
DIV + -0.001 
  (-0.25) 
STD(ROA) - -0.060*** 
  (-3.60) 
STD(RET) - -0.165*** 
  (-5.77) 
Firm Age ? 0.001 
  (0.35) 
SI - -0.305*** 
  (-15.20) 
M&A - -0.005** 
  (-2.23) 
DE - -0.003 
  (-1.53) 
Intercept  0.049*** 
  (3.15) 
IND/YEAR    YES 
No. of observations  4,757 
Adj. R2  0.489 
 
5.3 Climate Change Risk and Market Reaction 
            To test hypothesis 3, I follow Loughran and McDonald (2011) and construct the 
following model (5) to quantify the market’s reaction to climate change risk disclosure: 
CAR[-2,2] = a0 + a1Climate Change Risk Measurest + a2Ln (MV)t+ a3MBt  
            + a4PRE_FFt + a5AB_EPSt + a6Turnovert + a7NASDAQt + a8INST_OWNt  
            + a9Reporting Lagt + a10Forecast Dist + IND + YEAR + εt                   (5) 
 
where t refers to the fiscal year, CAR[-2,2] is the 5 day cumulative abnormal return around 
the 10-K filing date. DIV is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm distributes 
dividend (Compustat: DVT) in fiscal year t, and zero otherwise. PRE_FF is the prefile date 
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Fama-French alpha based on the three-factor model using days [-252, -6] (Tetlock et al. 
2008). AB_EPS is earning surprise, which equals current EPS minus last year’s EPS scaled 
by the prior year’s stock price. Turnover is the natural logarithm of shares traded in days 
[-252, -6] divided by shares outstanding on the 10-K filing date. NASDAQt is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the company is listed on NASDAQ stock exchange, and zero 
otherwise. Reporting Lagt  is the natural logarithm of the number of days between fiscal 
year end and the 10-K filing date. Forecast Dist is the standard deviation of analysts’ 
forecast in fiscal year t. 
Table 3 
Climate Change Risk and Market Reaction 
 
This table presents the regression results of the impact of climate change risk on market reaction around 10K 
filing date. Regressions include the year and industry fixed effects. The t-statistics reported in parentheses 
are based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity robust. To conserve space, I do not report the 
coefficient estimates for the year and industry dummies. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
 
Panel A Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean SD 25% Median 75% 
CAR[-2,2] 8,797 0.003 0.063 -0.023 0.001 0.027 
Climate Change Risk 8,797 0.534 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Regulatory Risk 8,797 0.343 0.475 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Physical Risk 8,797 0.432 0.495 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Other Risk 8,797 0.258 0.438 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Fog Index 4,701 0.287 0.212 0.197 0.238 0.315 
Ln(MV) 8,797 7.378 1.551 6.209 7.266 8.458 
MB 8,797 3.374 5.315 1.456 2.330 3.971 
PRE_FF 8,797 0.004 0.069 -0.033 0.003 0.040 
AB_EPS 8,797 0.015 0.116 -0.014 0.006 0.027 
Turnover 8,797 1.083 0.451 0.769 1.038 1.360 
NASDAQ 8,797 0.482 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Reporting Lag 8,797 3.800 0.325 3.583 3.829 4.043 
Forecast Dis 8,797 0.012 0.019 0.002 0.006 0.013 
 
Panel A, Table 3, reports the descriptive statistics of the main variables, including 
dependent, independent, and control variables. Panel B of Table 3 reports the relation 
between climate change risk and the market reaction around the 10-K filing date (Column 
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(1)). The results show that the market reaction to disclosing firms is significantly negative 
when compared to firms that do not disclose. More specially, the coefficient on Climate 
Change Risk is negative and significant (coefficient = -0.002, t =-1.68). Regarding 
economic significance, the CAR[-2,2] of firms with disclosed climate change risk is -0.002 
lower than that of the firm without disclosed climate change risk, which is 66.7% of the 
mean of CAR[-2,2] of the full sample (recall, mean CAR[-2,2] = 0.003). Overall, the results 
support my hypothesis 3, which suggests firms with disclosed climate change risk have 
lower stock market return.  
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Panel B Climate Change Risk and Market Reaction 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Pred. CAR[-2,2] CAR[-2,2] CAR[-2,2] CAR[-2,2] 
Climate Change Risk   - -0.002*    
  (-1.68)    
Regulatory Risk  -  -0.005***   
    (-3.59)   
Physical Risk -   -0.003*  
    (-1.84)  
Other Risk -    -0.005*** 
     (-3.52) 
Ln(MV) + -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
  (-2.48) (-2.14) (-2.48) (-2.15) 
MB - -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.59) (-0.72) (-0.59) (-0.66) 
PRE_FF + 0.034** 0.033** 0.034** 0.033** 
  (2.47) (2.42) (2.47) (2.40) 
AB_EPS + 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
  (3.01) (3.02) (3.01) (3.02) 
Turnover - -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.39) (-0.36) (-0.38) (-0.36) 
NASDAQ + -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
  (-0.75) (-1.28) (-0.69) (-1.15) 
Reporting Lag - 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.34) (0.45) (0.41) (0.48) 
Forecast Dis - -0.044 -0.040 -0.045 -0.041 
  (-0.79) (-0.71) (-0.80) (-0.73) 
Intercept  0.014 0.012 0.013 0.012 
  (1.20) (1.07) (1.12) (1.02) 
IND/YEAR    YES YES YES YES 
No. of observations  8,797 8,797 8,797 8,797 
Adj. R2  0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Panel C Readability of Climate Change Risk Disclosure and Market Reaction 
  (1) 
 Pred. CAR[-2,2] 
Fog Index - -0.004 
  (-1.39) 
Ln(MV) + -0.001 
  (-1.58) 
MB - 0.000 
  (0.72) 
PRE_FF + 0.039*** 
  (2.90) 
AB_EPS + 0.022** 
  (2.46) 
Turnover - -0.000 
  (-0.08) 
NASDAQ + 0.001 
  (0.36) 
Reporting Lag - 0.002 
  (0.76) 
Forecast Dis - -0.040 
  (-0.56) 
Intercept  -0.013 
  (-0.73) 
IND/YEAR    YES 
No. of observations  4,701 
Adj. R2  0.010 
 
Panel C of Table 3 shows the relation between readability of climate change risk 
disclosure texts and market reaction in the disclosing subsample. The coefficient of Fog 
Index is -0.004 and T value is -1.39, which indicate the significance under one-tailed test. 
I find that firms with less readable climate change disclosure experience lower market 
reaction around 10-K filing date.  These results are consistent with De Franco et al. (2015) 
who find that the stock market reacts more favorably to analyst reports with higher 
readability. My results are also in line with previous theoretical work that suggests signals 
that are more informative are easier to interpret and induce larger stock market reaction 
(Kim and Verrecchia 1991). 
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5.4 Climate Change Risk and Forward Earnings Responses Coefficients (FERC) 
             To test the hypothesis 4, following previous studies (Collins et al. 1994; 
Lundholm and Myers 2002; Ettredge et al 2005; Tucker and Zarowin 2006; Orpurt and 
Zang 2009; Choi et al.  2011; Hribar et al.  2014),  this paper constructs the following 
model (6) as forward earnings responses (FERC) test. 
Rt = a0 + a1Xt-1 + a2Xt+ a3Xt+1 + a4Rt+1 + a5Climate Change Risk Measurest  
            + a6Climate Change Risk Measurest *Xt-1  
            + a7Climate Change Risk Measurest*Xt                    
            + a8Climate Change Risk Measurest *Xt+1  
            + a9Climate Change Risk Measurest *Rt+1 + a10Ln(MV) + a11Ln(MV)* Xt+1 
            +a12LOSS + a13LOSS * Xt+1 + a12Size Growth + a13Size Growth * Xt+1 
           +a14EARNSTD + a15EARNSTD* Xt+1 + IND + YEAR + εt+1                    (6) 
 
 
where t refers to the fiscal year, Rt and Rt+1 are the annual stock returns measured over the 
12-months ending three months after the firm’s fiscal year-end at t and t+1, respectively. 
Xt-1, Xt, and Xt+1 are income available to common shareholders before extraordinary items 
for years t-1, t, and t+1, respectively, each deflated by the market value of equity three 
months after the end of fiscal year t-1. LOSS is an indicator variable equal to one if Xt+1 is 
negative, and zero otherwise. EARNSTD equals the standard deviation of X from year t-1 
to year t+1. If a8 is negative, firms with disclosed climate change risk have lower forward 
earnings response coefficients (FERC), and hypothesis 4 will be supported.  
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Table 4 
Climate Change Risk and Forward Earnings Responses Coefficients (FERC) 
 
This table presents the regression results of the impact of climate change risk on forward earnings responses 
coefficients(FERC). Regressions include the year and industry fixed effects. The t-statistics reported in 
parentheses are based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity robust. To conserve space, I do not report 
the coefficient estimates for the year and industry dummies. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
 
Panel A Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean SD 25% Median 75% 
Rt 9,264 0.216 0.549 -0.080 0.127 0.374 
Climate Change Risk 9,264 0.519 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Regulatory Risk 9,264 0.334 0.472 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Physical Risk 9,264 0.419 0.493 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Other Risk 9,264 0.252 0.434 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Fog Index 3,767 0.277 0.167 0.196 0.236 0.310 
Xt-1 9,264 0.006 0.134 0.002 0.037 0.059 
Xt 9,264 0.011 0.132 0.009 0.043 0.064 
Xt+1 9,264 0.009 0.147 0.005 0.046 0.068 
Rt+1 9,264 0.134 0.494 -0.145 0.072 0.300 
Ln(MV) 9,264 7.302 1.602 6.109 7.205 8.425 
LOSS 9,264 0.221 0.415 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Size Growth 9,264 0.298 0.649 0.003 0.136 0.353 
EARNSTD 9,264 0.153 0.742 0.019 0.040 0.092 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
Table 4 (continued) 
Panel B Climate Change Risk and Forward Earnings Responses Coefficients (FERC) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pred. Rt Rt Rt Rt 
Xt-1 - -0.216** -0.372*** -0.295*** -0.439*** 
  (-2.09) (-4.14) (-3.23) (-5.29) 
Xt + 0.200* 0.259** 0.210** 0.264*** 
  (1.70) (2.53) (1.99) (2.75) 
Xt+1 + 0.758** 0.793** 0.789** 0.787** 
  (2.13) (2.22) (2.23) (2.23) 
Rt+1 ? -0.091*** -0.087*** -0.090*** -0.085*** 
  (-4.26) (-4.44) (-4.44) (-4.53) 
Climate Change Risk   ? -0.019    
  (-1.36)    
Climate Change Risk *Xt-1 ? -0.999***    
  (-5.51)    
Climate Change Risk *Xt ? 0.261    
  (1.51)    
Climate Change Risk *Xt+1 - -0.021**    
  (-2.27)    
Climate Change Risk *Rt+1 ? 0.036    
  (1.16)    
Regulatory Risk ?  0.002   
   (0.10)   
Regulatory Risk *Xt-1 ?  -1.009***   
   (-4.45)   
Regulatory Risk *Xt ?  0.122   
   (0.59)   
Regulatory Risk *Xt+1 -  -0.021**   
   (-2.31)   
Regulatory Risk *Rt+1 ?  0.044   
   (1.24)   
Physical Risk ?   -0.019  
    (-1.33)  
Physical Risk *Xt-1 ?   -1.157***  
    (-5.60)  
Physical Risk *Xt ?   0.305*  
    (1.66)  
Physical Risk *Xt+1 -   -0.027***  
    (-3.43)  
Physical Risk *Rt+1 ?   0.0450  
    (1.41)  
Other Risk ?    0.011 
     (0.55) 
Other Risk *Xt-1 ?    -1.065*** 
     (-3.88) 
Other Risk *Xt ?    0.205 
     (0.78) 
Other Risk *Xt+1 -    0.010 
     (0.36) 
Other Risk *Rt+1 ?    0.056 
     (1.36) 
Ln(MV) ? 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
  (0.68) (0.78) (0.80) (0.81) 
Ln(MV) *Xt+1 + -0.085** -0.090** -0.093** -0.097** 
  (-2.00) (-2.10) (-2.19) (-2.25) 
LOSS ? 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.208*** 
  (14.40) (14.30) (14.38) (14.34) 
LOSS*Xt+1 - -0.186 -0.179 -0.184 -0.157 
  (-1.57) (-1.51) (-1.55) (-1.31) 
Size Growth ? -0.007 -0.005 -0.008 -0.007 
  (-0.31) (-0.20) (-0.36) (-0.30) 
Size Growth*Xt+1 + 0.255 0.255 0.266 0.285 
  (1.20) (1.19) (1.24) (1.36) 
EARNSTD ? 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.019 
  (1.20) (1.16) (1.16) (1.13) 
EARNSTD*Xt+1 - 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.007 
  (0.36) (0.41) (0.40) (0.44) 
Intercept  0.150*** 0.125** 0.148*** 0.124** 
  (2.81) (2.35) (2.77) (2.32) 
IND/YEAR    YES YES YES YES 
No. of observations  9,264 9,264 9,264 9,264 
Adj. R2  0.191 0.188 0.191 0.186 
40 
 
 
Panel A Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics of the main variables, including 
dependent, independent, and control variables. Panel B of Table 4 summarizes the results 
of climate change risk and the future earnings responses coefficients (FERC). The FERC 
is smaller for firms with disclosed climate change risk, compared to firms without climate 
change risk. More specially, the coefficient on Climate Change Risk * Xt+1 is negative and 
significant (coefficient = -0.021, t = -2.27), in support of hypothesis 4. The economic 
significance is 2.85%.28 
The findings are also consistent with rational structural uncertainty theory, which 
states that investors are inclined to place less weight on uncertain signals (Brav and Heaton 
2002). Under this framework, climate change risk creates uncertainties regarding future 
earnings and leads investors to place less weight on earnings signals, making FERC smaller. 
With regard to the control variables, I find that firms with LOSS and EARNSTD 
have lower FERC. Both Size and Growth are positively correlated with FERC. Overall, the 
results of control variables are in line with prior literature (Lundholm and Myers 2002; 
Choi et al. 2011). 
Panel C of Table 4 reports the relation between readability of climate change risk 
disclosure and forward earnings responses coefficients in the disclosing subsample. The 
coefficient on the interaction term between Fog Index*Xt+1 is negative and significant 
(coefficient = -0.095, t = -4.55), which suggests less readable climate change disclosure is 
associated with smaller FERC. This result shows that investors place less weights on future 
earnings of those firms with less readable climate change risk disclosure. 
 
                                                 
28 The economic significance equals 0.021/(0.758-0.021))=2.85% 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
Panel C Readability of Climate-Change Risk Disclosure and Forward Earnings Responses 
Coefficients (FERC) 
  (1) 
 Pred. Rt 
Xt-1 - -0.811*** 
  (-2.64) 
Xt + 0.340 
  (1.24) 
Xt+1 + 1.062* 
  (1.68) 
Rt+1 ? -0.044 
  (-0.72) 
Fog Index   ? 0.016 
  (0.26) 
Fog Index *Xt-1 ? -0.361 
  (-0.33) 
Fog Index *Xt ? -0.267 
  (-0.27) 
Fog Index *Xt+1 - -0.095*** 
  (-4.55) 
Fog Index *Rt+1 ? -0.153 
  (-0.83) 
Ln(MV) ? 0.001 
  (0.22) 
Ln(MV) *Xt+1 + -0.085 
  (-1.17) 
LOSS ? 0.212*** 
  (7.38) 
LOSS*Xt+1 - -0.391 
  (-1.28) 
Size Growth ? 0.020 
  (0.50) 
Size Growth*Xt+1 + -0.007 
  (-0.02) 
EARNSTD ? 0.310 
  (1.28) 
EARNSTD*Xt+1 - 2.584 
  (1.42) 
Intercept  0.104 
  (1.39) 
IND/YEAR    YES 
No. of observations  3,767 
Adj. R2  0.186 
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6. Additional Tests  
6.1 Predict Future Firm Value by Using Climate Change Risk Disclosure 
In Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, I explicitly explain why climate change risk affects 
future earnings and future uncertainty, which in turn leads to a lower stock return around 
10-K filing date. A natural extension is whether climate change risk can be related to the 
future value of disclosing firms. Following Masulis and Mobbs (2014), I construct the 
following model (7) to examine the relation between climate change risk and future firm 
value. 
Tobin’s Qt+1 = a0 + a1Climate Change Risk Measurest + a2Ln (MV)t+ a3R&Dt  
            + a4Firm Aget + a5Cash Flowt + a6Cash Flowt-1  
            + a7Cash Flowt-2 + a8CAPXt + IND + YEAR + εt+1                                    (7) 
 
As Lang and Stulz (1994) suggest, Tobin’s Q refers to the ratio between the market 
value of assets divided by book value of assets and this measure does not need the risk 
adjustment or normalization across firms.  
The results reported in Table 5 document that firms with disclosed climate change 
risk have significantly lower future firm value, measured by Tobin’s Q (coefficient = -
0.224, t = -11.42). These findings are consistent with the conjecture that climate change 
risk is useful in predicting the future firm values of disclosing firms. The economic impact 
of climate change risk on future Tobin’s Q is 15.7% of the sample mean.29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 -0.224/1.431 = 0.157, where 1.431 is the mean Tobin’s Qt+1 in the sample. 
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Table 5 
Climate Change Risk and Future Firm Value 
 
This table presents the regression results of the impact of climate change risk on future firm value. 
Regressions include the year and industry fixed effects. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on 
standard errors that are heteroskedasticity robust. To conserve space, I do not report the coefficient estimates 
for the year and industry dummies. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels (two-tailed), respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pred.  Tobin’s Qt+1 Tobin’s Qt+1  Tobin’s Qt+1  Tobin’s Qt+1  
Climate Change Risk   - -0.224***    
  (-11.42)    
Regulatory Risk  -  -0.277***   
    (-14.02)   
Physical Risk -   -0.147***  
    (-7.94)  
Other Risk -    -0.233*** 
     (-11.86) 
Ln (MV)t + 0.110*** 0.115*** 0.107*** 0.112*** 
  (15.54) (16.07) (15.06) (15.58) 
R&Dt + 4.189*** 4.201*** 4.246*** 4.246*** 
  (16.84) (16.95) (16.99) (17.07) 
Firm Age + -0.198*** -0.200*** -0.201*** -0.199*** 
  (-15.03) (-15.25) (-15.20) (-15.11) 
Cash Flowt + 1.091*** 1.070*** 1.106*** 1.093*** 
  (4.21) (4.16) (4.24) (4.21) 
Cash Flowt-1 + 0.080 0.077 0.083 0.080 
  (0.83) (0.80) (0.85) (0.82) 
Cash Flowt-2 - -0.122 -0.124 -0.123 -0.124 
  (-1.58) (-1.60) (-1.59) (-1.60) 
CAPX + -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
  (-1.18) (-1.35) (-1.30) (-1.42) 
Intercept  0.929*** 0.852*** 0.885*** 0.827*** 
  (8.84) (8.50) (8.88) (8.41) 
IND/YEAR    YES YES YES YES 
No. of observations  9,515 9,515 9,515 9,515 
Adj. R2  0.392 0.393 0.387 0.390 
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6.2 Voluntary (Survey) vs. Mandatory (10-K): which is more informative? 
Before the issuance of guidance, Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), already started 
collecting climate change risk disclosure by surveying S&P 500 starting in the year 2006.30 
The CDP requested company executives to respond to a series of questions regarding 
climate change, including the existence of climate change risk (regulatory, physical, and 
other risk), carbon emission intensity, governance and so on. Attendance to the survey is 
voluntary. The guidance represents an inflection point where climate change risk disclosure 
went from being voluntary to mandatory.  
Using the CDP survey, I classify climate change risk into the same three categories: 
regulatory (CDP), physical (CDP), and other risk (CDP), same as for the 10-K disclosure 
under SEC FR-82. If a firm has any of these three categories of risks, I define an indicator 
variable, CDP, as one, meaning the firm is exposed to climate change risk based on the 
CDP survey, and zero otherwise. Then I repeated all the previous analyses by including 
both voluntary climate change risk disclosure (i.e., CDP) and mandatory climate change 
risk disclosure in 10-K filings (i.e., 10-K which is equal to Climate Change Risk defined 
earlier). Table 6 reports the results from this replication.31 As shown in Panel A, the 
coefficients on 10-K and the interaction terms are significant and consistent with the 
previous results in four out of five regressions. Specifically, the coefficient on ROAt*10-K 
in Column (2) is significantly negative, consistent with Panel B of Table 2. The coefficient 
on 10-K in Column (3) is significantly negative, consistent with Panel B of Table 3. The 
coefficient on 10-K*Xt+1 in Column (4) is significantly negative, consistent with Panel B 
                                                 
30 As of the end of 2015, CDP has 822 institutional investor signatories with $55 trillion assets under 
management. 
31 The sample size is largely reduced because that this test only contains S&P 500 firms, since CDP is 
conducted in S&P firms consistently after year 2006. 
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of Table 4. The coefficient on 10-K in Column (5) is significantly negative, consistent with 
Table 5. Moreover, the coefficients on the 10-K disclosure are more negative than those on 
CDP disclosure in all five regressions and significantly so in two regressions (Panel B of 
Table 6). Overall, mandatory 10-K disclosure has more predictive power than voluntary 
CDP disclosure.  
Table 6 
The Usefulness of Voluntary (Survey) vs. Mandatory (10K) Disclosure 
 
This table presents the regression results of the usefulness of climate change risk in 10K and CDP survey. 
Regressions include the year and industry fixed effects. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on 
standard errors that are heteroskedasticity robust. To conserve space, I do not report the coefficient estimates 
for the year and industry dummies. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels (two-tailed), respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
 
Panel A: Usefulness of Voluntary (Survey) vs. Mandatory (10K) Disclosure 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Pred.  AdjROA t+1 ROA t+1 CAR[-2,2] Rt Tobin’s Qt+1 
10-K (β1) - -0.002 0.006 -0.005** -0.460* -0.194*** 
  (-0.59) (1.33) (-2.34) (-1.96) (-5.64) 
CDP (β2)   - 0.000 -0.006 -0.001 0.726*** -0.079** 
  (0.14) (-1.08) (-0.44) (2.79) (-2.22) 
ROAt*10-K (β3) -  -0.088*    
   (-1.82)    
ROAt*CDP(β4)   -  0.050    
   (0.93)    
10-K* Xt+1(β5) -    -7.412***  
     (-3.70)  
CDP*Xt+1(β6) -    -3.718  
     (-1.46)  
Controls  YES YES YES YES YES 
Intercept  -0.027 0.010 0.003 -1.201 0.648** 
  (-0.88) (0.43) (0.11) (-1.00) (2.06) 
IND/YEAR    YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of observations  1,306 1,306 1,306 1,306 1,306 
Adj. R2  0.744 0.469 0.010 0.371 0.632 
            Panel B: Coefficients Test of Voluntary (Survey) vs. Mandatory (10K) Disclosure 
F Test of β1=β2  0.14  1.48  4.93* 
       
F Test of β3=β4   2.86*    
       
F Test of β5=β6     1.49  
 
There are two reasons that may explain the observed phenomenon. First, the scope 
of the survey is very limited. Firm participation is totally voluntary, and many large 
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companies did not participate in the CDP survey, including Apple Inc., Amazon, BB&T, 
Berkshire Hathaway, and Netflix, etc. 32  The low response rates largely constrain the 
comparability of CDP data with that of the 10-K disclosure. Second, not all of the CDP 
data is publicly available. Firms must elect to make their responses available to all or 
specific investors or not at all. According to Matsumura et al. (2014), approximately 19.59% 
of firms do not consent to their responses being made public. This limited availability 
restricts ordinary investors from assessing climate change information of firms as well as 
running reliable analyses. 
6.3 Benefits of Disclosure  
Based on the results reported in Section 5, firms with disclosed climate change risk 
exhibit lower future performance, earnings persistence, market reaction to 10-K 
announcements, FERC and firm value. If the climate change risk disclosure conveys bad 
news to the market, one might ask why firms decide to disclose this information.  
First, disclosing this information an act of regulatory compliance. My sample is 
post-guidance period meaning firms with material climate change risk should disclose this 
information in their annual reporting to fulfill the mandatory reporting requirement.  
Second, honest disclosure of climate change risk helps firms to avoid litigation. On 
November 8, 2015, Attorney General of State of New York reached a settlement with 
Peabody Energy (the world largest coal company) concerning the allegation that the firm 
misleads investors in their climate change risk disclosures. Peabody was aware that future 
potential climate change regulation would adversely impact firm’s future performance, but 
                                                 
32 CDP S&P 500 Climate Change Report 2013. https://b8f65cb373b1b7b15feb-
c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/000/626/original/C
DP-SP500-climate-report-2013.pdf?1470233007 
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it stated the following in 10-K (2011-2014): “it was not possible to predict the impact that 
any such laws or regulation may have on Peabody’s results of operations, financial 
condition or cash flow.” In this settlement, Peabody agreed to disclose more potential 
climate change risk in its SEC filings (page 9).33 On November 4, 2015, Attorney General 
of State of New York launched an investigation into Exxon Mobil to determine whether 
the firm lied to investors about climate change risk.  Moreover, Attorney Generals of 17 
states have formed a coalition to consider investigations on whether other fossil fuel 
industry companies also hide their climate change risk to investors or public.  
Third, honestly disclosing climate change risk also helps firms maintain a good 
reputation with stakeholders. Inadequate climate change risk disclosure can incur 
regulatory scrutiny, such as SEC comment letters. Based on Audit Analytics, I find 80 SEC 
comment letters regarding climate change disclosure in the sample period: 2010-2014. As 
previous literature shows, SEC comment letters induce adverse consequences to firms such 
as higher audit fees (Gietzmann and Pettinicchio 2014) and higher cost of debt 
(Cunningham et al. 2016). 
6.4 Control Disclosure Choice  
Even though the 2010 guidance requires firms to disclose climate change impact in 
their annual reports, firms still have the incentive to suppress potentially bad news. In the 
first set robustness checks, I employ a Heckman two-stage model (Heckman 1979) to 
address this potential concern.  
In the first stage, following previous environmental disclosure literature (Berthelot 
et al. 2003; Matsumura et al. 2014), I construct the following model to estimate the 
                                                 
33 http://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Peabody-Energy-Assurance-signed.pdf. 
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likelihood of firms disclosing climate change risk under their annual reports. 
Climate Change Risk = a0 + a1Coastal State+ a2Ln (Assets)t + a3MBt  
            + a4ENV_STRt+ a5ENV_CONt + a6CDPt + a7IND_CCRt-1 
            + IND + YEAR + εt+1                                                                       (8) 
 
As noted in Lennox et al. (2011), the first stage in a Heckman model must include 
an exclusion restriction, which refers to an exogenous variable that does not influence the 
dependent variable in the second stage. I include the variable, Coastal State, which equals 
one if a firm is headquartered in coastal states, and zero otherwise. I expect that firms in 
coastal states are more likely to be affected by extreme weather and sea-level rise. Thus, I 
expect that these firms are more inclined to disclose climate change risk. However, firms’ 
geographic position might not influence firms’ future performance, earnings persistence, 
stock market returns, FERC, and firm value. 
Following Patten (1991; 1992) and Matsumura et al. (2014), I also include firm size. 
They find that larger firms are more likely to disclose the environmental information. I also 
control firm’s growth (MB). However, following Matsumura et al. (2014), we do not 
predict a sign for MB. I also include firms’ environmental CSR performance: ENV_STR 
and ENV_CON, since Walden and Schwartz (1997) and Matsumura et al. (2014) argue that 
environmental CSR performance plays an important role in determining environmental 
disclosure. Moreover, if firms disclose climate change risk in CDP survey, I expect that 
firms are more likely to disclose climate change risk in SEC filings. To control disclosure 
pressure from peer firms, I also include average industry-level climate change risk in year 
t-1. To control for industry membership and year effects on climate change disclosure, I 
also include the industry and year fixed effects. 
Table 7 reports the results. As I expected, Panel A of Table 7 shows that Coastal 
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State, Ln (Assets)t, ENV_CONt,  CDPt, IND_CCRt-1 are positively correlated with climate 
change risk disclosure. Panel B of Table 7 reports the second stage results, and I find that 
after controlling disclosure choice in my second stage model by including the Inverse Mills 
ratio (IMR), all the results are still robust. 
I also test the multicollinearity of the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) in the Panel C of 
Table 7. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of the IMR ranges from 1.52 to 5.24, which 
is less than the cutoff of 10. The results indicate the multicollinearity of the IMR is not 
severe. 
Table 7 
The Usefulness of Climate Change Risk Disclosure: Controlling Disclosure Choice 
 
This table presents the regression results of the usefulness of climate change risk after controlling disclosure 
choice. Regressions include the year and industry fixed effects. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are 
based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity robust. To conserve space, I do not report the coefficient 
estimates for the year and industry dummies. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
 
Panel A Choice of Climate Change Risk Disclosure 
  (1) 
 Pred.  Climate Change Risk 
Coastal State + 0.102*** 
  (3.18) 
Ln (Assets)t + 0.133*** 
  (12.01) 
MBt ? -0.003 
  (-1.35) 
ENV_STRt + -0.010 
  (-0.41) 
ENV_CONt + 0.346*** 
  (6.15) 
CDPt + 0.084 
  (1.36) 
IND_CCRt-1 + 0.858** 
  (2.46) 
Intercept  -1.061*** 
  (-3.75) 
IND/YEAR    YES 
No. of observations  9,808 
Pseudo R2  0.2781 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
Panel B The Usefulness of Climate Change Risk Disclosure: Controlling Disclosure Choice 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Pred.  AdjROAt+1 ROAt+1 CAR[-2,2] Rt Tobin’sQt+1 
Climate Change Risk - -0.002** -0.001 -0.003* -0.015 -0.210*** 
  (-1.96) (-0.22) (-1.98) (-1.24) (-10.84) 
ROAt *Climate Change Risk -  -0.052***    
   (-3.62)    
Climate Change Risk*Xt+1 -    -0.020**  
     (-2.25)  
IMR  0.001 -0.009*** -0.000 0.008 0.204*** 
  (1.43) (-10.46) (-0.73) (1.07) (14.98) 
Controls  YES YES YES YES YES 
Intercept  -0.003 0.055*** 0.014 0.123** 0.167 
  (-0.43) (3.53) (1.19) (2.19) (1.45) 
IND/YEAR    YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of observations  9,087 9,076 8,738 9,218 9,186 
Adj. R2  0.4145 0.635 0.010 0.189 0.423 
Panel C Variance-Inflation-Factors(VIF) of IMR  
  4.98 5.27 1.52 4.05 5.24 
 
7. Robustness Checks 
I conduct several robustness tests to check the robustness of my findings. First, I 
examine that the effects of disclosing multiple climate change risks on dependent variables. 
Aggregating regulatory, physical and other risks, I create the Climate Change Risk Index 
that ranges from 0 to 3, with a higher value indicating more types of climate change risk. I 
find that the results are still robust. Second, this paper shows the usefulness of climate 
change risk disclosure. A natural question is that which type risk is more informative than 
the others. I employ a horse racing test by putting all three risks in regressions. I find that 
regulatory risk is more informative than the others for future performance, earnings 
persistence, and market reaction test. However, I find that physical risk is more useful for 
FERC test than other risks. Third, the previous results suggest that firms with climate 
change risk have lower FERC. Another related question is that what is the relationship 
between climate change risk and current ERC. I find that firms with climate change risk 
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also have lower current ERC, which is also consistent with rational structural uncertainty 
theory (Brav and Heaton 2002). 
8. Conclusions 
8.1 Summary of Conclusions 
On February 8, 2010, SEC issued interpretive guidance (SEC FR-82) and required 
listed firms to disclose climate change risk in their 10-Ks. However, the guidance has been 
controversial. The essential of the controversy is whether climate change risk disclosure 
provides useful information to investors and other stakeholders.  
Motivated mainly by the current debate, this paper examines the usefulness of 
climate change risk disclosure using firm-year observations in Russell 3000 Index. First, 
this paper reviews the legislative process of 2010 guidance. I find that institutional 
investors and Democratic politicians are the main force in lobbying SEC to regulate climate 
change disclosure. Moreover, the guidance was passed in the SEC with a clear party-line 
vote, indicating political ideology and party politics are important in the legal process. 
These findings are consistent with interest group theory, which argues groups lobby for or 
against in their own interest. Second, firms that disclose climate change risk under the 
guidance have lower future ROA and the poor performance is driven by lower profit 
margin, not by assets turnover. Third, these firms have lower earnings persistence and 
smaller forward earnings response coefficient (FERC). Fourth, event study reveals that 
firms with disclosed climate change risk experience significantly lower cumulative 
abnormal return during 5-days around 10-K filing date, indicating that investors 
incorporate this information into their investment decisions. Fifth, firms with disclosed 
climate change risk have lower future firm value as capture by Tobin’s Q. Finally, utilizing 
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textual analysis, I find that less readable climate change risk disclosure texts exacerbates 
the aforementioned effects. Taken together, this paper shows the usefulness of climate 
change risk disclosure and supports mandatory disclosure of material climate change risk 
under SEC FR-82. 
8.2 Limitations and Future Directions 
Climate change risk disclosure is valuable to investors, as evidence in this paper 
shows that disclosed climate change risk is associated with future earnings, earnings 
persistence, FERC, and stock market reaction. However, as we all know, disclosure is not 
free. The cost of preparing climate change risk disclosure, which represents the firm’s 
private information, may not be trivial. This paper does not directly compare the benefits 
and costs of climate change disclosure nor express a position on whether the regulation 
(SEC 2010 FR82) improves or reduces overall social welfare. Similarly, some EPA 
regulations are also very controversial, which is reflected in media coverage and lawsuits 
(e.g., Michigan v. EPA).34 The Supreme Court argues that “It is not rational, never mind 
“appropriate,” to impose billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few dollars 
in health or environmental benefits”.35 From this perspective, this paper is an initial attempt 
to show the potential usefulness of these climate change disclosures to investors. In the 
future, we need more evidence on the cost and benefits of the 2010 guidance.  
                                                 
34 WSJ, 2011, The United States of EPA. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204630904577056393981840650 
35 https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-46_10n2.pdf 
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Appendix A: Summary of Signatories in the Petitions to Request 2010 SEC 
Guidance 
Date Name of Signatories Position Type 
9/18/2007 
California Public Employees' 
Retirement System 
  Institutional Investor 
John Chiang California State Controller Politician (Democratic) 
California State Teachers’ 
Retirement System 
  Institutional Investor 
Bill Lockyer California State Treasurer Politician (Democratic) 
Ceres   Institutional Investor 
Environmental Defense   NGO 
F&C Management   Institutional Investor 
Alex Sink Florida Chief Financial Officer Politician (Democratic) 
Friends of the Earth   NGO 
Jonathan Miller Kentucky State Treasurer Politician (Democratic) 
David G. Lemoine Maine State Treasurer Politician (Democratic) 
Nancy K. Kopp Maryland State Treasurer Politician (Democratic) 
The Nathan Cummings 
Foundation 
  Institutional Investor 
Orin Kramer New Jersey State Investment Council Politician (Democratic) 
William C. Thompson New York City Comptroller Politician (Democratic) 
Andrew M. Cuomo New York State Attorney General Politician (Democratic) 
Thomas P. DiNapoli New York State Comptroller Politician (Democratic) 
Richard Moore North Carolina State Treasurer Politician (Democratic) 
Randall Edwards Oregon State Treasurer Politician (Democratic) 
Pax World Management 
Corporation 
  Institutional Investor 
Frank T. Caprio Rhode Island General Treasurer Politician (Democratic) 
Jeb Spaulding Vermont State Treasurer Politician (Democratic) 
9/20/2007 Peter Franchot Comptroller of Maryland Politician (Democratic) 
10/17/2007 David Purcell CEO, Climate Appraisal Services Manager 
10/24/2007 Coleman Stipanovich 
Executive Director, State Board of 
Administration of Florida 
Politician (Democratic) 
11/5/2007 Bennett Freeman 
Senior Vice President, Calvert Asset 
Management Co. 
Institutional Investor 
11/29/2007 Corey M. Amon 
Director of Research, Taplin, Canida 
& Haba cht 
Institutional Investor 
11/29/2007 David Thompson 
Managing Director, Dwight Asset 
Management 
Institutional Investor 
11/30/2007 Stephen A. Eason 
Executive Vice President, Smith 
Breeden Associates, Inc. 
Institutional Investor 
12/3/2007 C. Thomas Clapp 
 Executive Director and Chief 
Investment Officer, Sterling Capital 
Management LLC 
Institutional Investor 
2/8/2008 Peter Dunscombe 
Chairman, Institutional Investors 
Group on Climate Change 
Institutional Investor 
4/15/2008 David P. O'Connor 
Senior Vice President, Delaware 
Investment Advisers 
Institutional Investor 
5/6/2008 James Lobdell Unknown Individual 
5/6/2008 Jeffrey Plate Retired Individual 
5/6/2008 Jason Griffith Unknown Individual 
5/14/2008 Nancy Herbert Newground Social Investment Institutional Investor 
5/14/2008 John Harrington CEO, Harrington Investments Inc. Institutional Investor 
5/23/2008 Anne Mertl Millhollen Unknown Individual 
5/24/2008 Kathleen Labriola Unknown Individual 
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Appendix A (continued) 
Date Name of Signatories Position Type 
5/25/2008 Shirley Faircloth Unknown Individual 
6/9/2009 
Mindy S. Lubber President, Ceres Institutional Investor 
Kevin L. Doran University of Colorado Law School Professor 
Vickie Patton 
Deputy General Counsel, 
Environmental Defense Fund 
Institutional Investor 
10/8/2009 Anonymous Unknown Individual 
11/8/2009 Carole Bennett Simmons Unknown Individual 
11/8/2009 Susan Schneier Unknown Individual 
11/16/2009 Linda Currie Unknown Individual 
11/16/2009 Terry Rosson Unknown Individual 
11/23/2009 
Doug Pearce 
Chief Executive Officer, British 
Columbia Investment Management  
Institutional Investor 
California Public Employees' 
Retirement System 
  Institutional Investor 
John Chiang California State Controller Politician (Democratic) 
California State Teachers’ 
Retirement System 
  Institutional Investor 
Bill Lockyer California State Treasurer Politician (Democratic) 
Mindy Lubber President of Ceres Institutional Investor 
Denise L. Nappier Connecticut State Treasurer Politician (Democratic) 
Vickie Patton 
Deputy General Counsel, 
Environmental Defense Fund 
Institutional Investor 
Elizabeth E. McGeveran 
Senior Vice President, Investment 
F&C Management Ltd. 
Institutional Investor 
Alex Sink 
Chief Financial Officer, State of 
Florida 
Politician (Democratic) 
Michelle Chan Program Director, Friends of the Earth NGO 
Richard Metcalf 
Director, Laborers’ International 
Union of North America 
NGO 
Nancy K. Kopp Treasurer, State of Maryland Politician (Democratic) 
Lance E. Lindblom 
President & CEO, The Nathan 
Cummings Foundation 
Institutional Investor 
Andrew M. Cuomo Attorney General, State of New York Politician (Democratic) 
Thomas P. DiNapoli New York State Comptroller Politician (Democratic) 
Janet Cowell State Treasurer, North Carolina Politician (Democratic) 
Ben Westlund Treasurer, State of Oregon Politician (Democratic) 
Julie Gorte 
Senior Vice President, Pax World 
Management  
Institutional Investor 
Jeb Spaulding Treasurer, State of Vermont Politician (Democratic) 
Data Sources: https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-547/4-547.shtml 
Appendix B:  Signatories in Petition for 2010 SEC Guidance by Type 
 
Individual
16%
Institutional 
Investor
37%
NGO
6%
Manager
2%
Professor
1%
Politician 
(Democratic)
38%
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Appendix C: Variable Definitions 
Variable  Definition 
Climate Change Risk Measures 
Climate Change Risk  
Climate Change Risk equals one if a firm discloses any type climate change risk in its 10-
K, including Regulatory Risk, Physical Risk, and Other Risk, and zero otherwise. Source: 
Ceres and CookESG Research 
Regulatory Risk 
Regulatory Risk equals one if a firm reports being subject to climate change regulation, 
which includes but is not limited to EPA’s regulations, Clean Air Act, Renewable 
Energy Act, Paris Agreement, Kyoto Protocol, renewable portfolio standard (RPS), 
European Union Emission Trading System, Cross-State Air Pollution Rules, United 
Kingdom's Carbon Reduction Commitment, emissions trading schemes, and carbon tax or 
carbon fees, and zero otherwise. Source: Ceres and CookESG Research 
Physical Risk 
Physical Risk equals one if a firm reports being subject to the physical parameter of the 
climate change, which includes but is not limited to floods, hurricanes, droughts, storms, 
water availability, extreme temperatures, temperatures change, severe weather, sea level 
change, or change of these weather conditions, and zero otherwise. Source: Ceres and 
CookESG Research 
Other Risk 
Other Risk equals one if a firm reports being subject to other climate change risk, which 
includes but is  not limited to business trend, changing consumer preference or behavior, 
potential reputation loss, and other climate change related matters, and zero otherwise. 
Source: Ceres and CookESG Research 
Fog Index 
Fog Index=0.4*(average words per sentence + percent of complex words)   
Where complex word refers to one with three or more syllables. Higher fog index 
indicates less readability. Fog Index is scaled by 100. 
Future Performance Tests 
AdjROAt+1 
Industry-adjusted ROA, which equals firm-specific ROA minus the median ROA for the 
same Fama-French industry and year t+1. ROA is calculated as income before extraordinary 
items (IB) divided by lagged total assets (AT). Source: Compustat 
AdjProfit Margint+1 Industry-adjusted profit margin, which equals firm-specific profit margin minus the median 
profit margin for the same Fama-French industry and year t+1. Profit Margin is calculated 
as income before extraordinary items (IB) divided by sales (SALES). Source: Compustat 
AdjAssets Turnovert+1 
Industry-adjusted assets turnover, which equals firm-specific assets turnover minus the 
median assets tunrover for the same Fama-French industry and year t+1. Assets Turnover is 
calculated as sales (SALES) divided by lagged total assets (AT). Source: Compustat 
AdjROAt 
Industry-adjusted ROA, which equals firm-specific ROA minus the median ROA for the 
same Fama-French industry and year t.  ROA is calculated as income before extraordinary 
items (IB) divided by lagged total assets (AT). Source: Compustat 
AdjProfit Margint Industry-adjusted profit margin, which equals firm-specific profit margin minus the 
median profit margin for the same Fama-French industry and year t. Profit Margin is 
calculated as income before extraordinary items (IB) divided by sales (SALES). Source: 
Compustat 
AdjAssets Turnovert 
Industry-adjusted assets turnover, which equals firm-specific assets turnover minus the 
median assets turnrover for the same Fama-French industry and year t. Assets Turnover is 
calculated as sales (SALES) divided by lagged total assets (AT). Source: Compustat 
Ln(ASSETS) Natural logarithm of total assets (AT) in the fiscal year end. Source: Compustat 
MB 
Market to book ratio refers to market value of equity (PRCC_F*CSHO) divided by book 
value of equity(CEQ). Source: Compustat 
Return 
Buy and hold return in year t. ((PRCC_Ft/AJEXt)/(PRCC_Ft-1 / AJEXt-1)-1). Source: 
Compustat 
Z-Score 
3.3*(NIt ⁄ ATt-1) + 1.0*(SALESt ⁄ ATt-1) + 1.4*(REt ⁄ ATt-1) + 1.2*((ACTt-LCTt) ⁄ATt-1). 
Source: Compustat 
IND Industry fixed effects. Industry refers to Fama-French 48 Industries 
YEAR Year fixed effects. 
Earnings Persistence Tests 
ROAt+1 
ROAt+1 is ROA of year t+1.ROA is calculated as income before extraordinary items (IB) 
divided by lagged total assets (AT). Source: Compustat 
ROAt+2 
ROAt+2 is ROA of year t+2.ROA is calculated as income before extraordinary items (IB) 
divided by lagged total assets (AT). Source: Compustat 
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Ln(MV) 
Natural logarithm of market value (CSHO*PRCC_F) in the fiscal year end. Source: 
Compustat 
DIV 
Indicator variable that equals one if firm distribute dividend (DVT) in fiscal year t, and 
zero otherwise. Source: Compustat 
STD(ROA) the standard deviation of the ROA in the last five fiscal years. Source: Compustat 
STD(RET) the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns (RET) in the year t-1. Source: CRSP 
Firm Age 
Natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm appears in Compustat. Source: 
Compustat 
SI Special item (SPI) is divided by lagged total assets (AT). Source: Compustat 
M&A 
Indicator variable that equals one if the firm is involved in mergers or acquisitions (AQC), 
and zero otherwise; Source: Compustat 
DE 
Indicator variable that equals one if firm is incorporated in Delaware in fiscal year t, and 
zero otherwise. Source: Compustat 
Market Reaction Tests  
CAR[-2,2] 5 days’ cumulative abnormal return around 10-K filing date. Source: CRSP 
PRE_FF 
The prefile date Fama-French alpha based on 3 factor model by using days [-252, -6]. 
Source: CRSP 
AB_EPS 
The earning surprise, which equals current eps minus last year’s eps scaled by prior year’s 
stock price Source: Compustat 
Turnover 
Natural logarithm of shares traded in days [-252, -6] divided by shares outstanding on file 
date. Source: CRSP 
NASDAQ 
Indicator variable is stock is listed on NASDAQ stock exchange, 0 otherwise. Source: 
CRSP 
Reporting Lag 
Natural logarithm of the number of days between fiscal year end date and 10-K filing date. 
Source: Compustat 
Forecast Dis The standard deviation of analysts’ forecast in the fiscal year. Source: I/B/E/S 
Forward Earnings Response Coefficients (FERC) 
Rt , and  Rt+1 
Rt  and  Rt+1 are the annual stock returns measured over the 12-month periods ending three 
months after the firm’s fiscal year-end at t and t+1, respectively Source: Compustat 
Xt-1, Xt, and Xt+1 
Xt-1, Xt, and Xt+1 are income available to common shareholders before extraordinary items 
for years t-1, t, and t+1, respectively, each deflated by the market value of equity three 
months after the end of fiscal year t-1, respectively. Source: Compustat 
LOSS 
Indicator variable that equals one if Xt+1  is negative, and zero otherwise.  Source: 
Compustat 
Size Growth Total assets growth rate from year t-1 to year t+1. Source: Compustat 
EARNSTD The standard deviation of X from year t-1 to year t+1. Source: Compustat 
Firm Value Tests  
Tobin’s Q 
Following Duchin (2010) and Masulis and Mobbs (2014), 
Tobin’s Q equals (Market Value of Assets)/(0.9*book value of assets+0.1*market value of 
assets) 
Where market value of assets is market value of assets is book value of total assets (AT) 
less book value of equity (CEQ) less deferred taxes (TXTDB) plus market value of equity 
(CSHO * PRCC_F). Source: Compustat 
R&D R&D expenditure (XRD) divided by total assets (AT). Source: Compustat 
Cash Flow Operating cash flow (OANCF) divided by total assets (AT). Source: Compustat 
CAPX Capital expenditure divided by total assets (AT). Source: Compustat 
Mandatory vs 
Voluntary 
 
CDP 
Indicator variable that equals one if firms disclose climate change risk in CDP survey, and 
zero otherwise. Source: CDP 
10-K  Equals to Climate Change Risk. Source: Ceres and CookESG Research 
Heckman Two Stage Model 
 
Coastal State 
Indicator variable that equals one if firms headquartered in coastal states, and zero 
otherwise. Coastal states refer to Alabama, Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode 
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Island, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. Source: Compustat  
ENV_CON The number of environment concerns in CSR. Source: KLD 
ENV_STR The number of environment strengths in CSR. Source: KLD 
CDP 
Indicator variable that equals one if firms disclose climate change risk in CDP survey, and 
zero otherwise. Source: CDP 
IND_CCRt-1 
Average industry-level climate change risk of 10-K filings in year t-. Source: Ceres and 
CookESG Research 
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